*The Seventh and Eighth*

OF THE

# Controverſial LETTERS,

OR

## Grand Controverſie,

Concerning

**The pretended Temporal Authority of *POPES* over the whole Earth,**

And the

**True Sovereign of *KINGS* within their own reſpective Kingdoms.**

Between two Engliſh Gentlemen,

***The one of the Church of* England:**
***The other of the Church of* Rome.**

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*LONDON*,

Printed for *Henry Brome* and *Benjamin Tooke*, at the Gun; & at the Ship in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1673.

*FRIEND*,

I Know not how it happens; but the more you ſhew me, methinks the leſs I ſee. While I read your Letters I find not what to except againſt; yet when I look off I remain ſtill unſatisfi'd. That there ſhould be a Spiritual Power diſtinct from the Temporal, is plainly neceſſary in it ſelf, and own'd by us. We go not to *Weſtminſter Hall* for remiſſion of our ſins, or to hear the Word of God preach'd, or receive the Sacraments. Theſe things belong to Spiritual Magiſtrates, amongſt whom the Chief with us is the Biſhop of *Canterbury*, as with you the Biſhop of *Rome*. And ſince for Orders ſake, and the nature of Government, a Chief there muſt be, It matters not much whether, as one wittily ſaid, the top link of the Spiritual Chain be faſtned to the Chair of *Canterbury*, or of *Rome*. So the Temporal Primacy be undiſturb'd, and undiſturbable by the Spiritual, it ſeems all one vvhether have it; I mean in point of Safety, for true or falſe is another queſtion. And truly, I neither ſee how your Spiritual Primacy ſhould diſturb it, if all be true you ſay, nor why I ſhould doubt of the truth of what you ſay, while I conſider you ſay nothing of your own head; but bring ſuch Vouchers for every thing, that I think your Church cannot ſay otherwiſe, unleſs ſhe throw off that Reverence which, with ſo much oſtentation, ſhe profeſſes to have for Antiquity. And yet of neceſſity there muſt be more in it. The miſchiefs, againſt which I would be ſecur'd, have actually happened: Princes have been depoſed, and the world has been too much concerned in the effects of this Power to be ignorant of it. Our own Princes have not been exempt from attempts of this na-

ture, and the hazard the nation ran in 88. is not yet out of our memory. So that manifeſtly, either you believe one thing and do another, or you have not inform'd me truly, but covered an ugly face with a handſom vizar. Truly I believe better of your candour, than to ſuſpect you deceive me by deſign; yet certainly things are not ſo cleer and ſmooth of your ſide, as you would make me believe. To read your Papers, one would think nothing could be more innocent than your doctrine in this Point; yet the vvorld is witneſs of doings far from Innocent. I muſt confeſs, I was ſometime ſufficiently perplext to unriddle this myſtery. But at laſt I remembred *Bellarmin*, and vvhen I reflected on his *Indirect*, and *in ordine ad Spiritualia* Power, methought I had found the clew to guide me out of this Labyrinth. That diſtinction does it Friend, and in truth, I never ſo well underſtood the vertue of Diſtinctions before; for by the help of this, I perceive you may ſay enough to paſs for honeſt men, and in the mean time reſerve as much liberty as heart can vviſh to play the knave. Pardon my bluntneſs, 'tis without malice I aſſure you; but I am too much intent upon the Queſtion to be choice of my vvords, eſpecially to you: and conſider a little. You have told me the Spiritual and Civil Power are diſtinct; that the Popes Power is Spiritual, and is not Coactive. Why *Bellarmin*, and any that follows him, will grant all this. But, if vve conclude thence, That the Pope has nothing to do vvith Temporals, they vvill not ſuffer us, but ſay, His Power is indeed of its own nature Spiritual, and directly regards only the good of Souls; but if Temporals concern that good, His Power is extended to them too; not directly, as if they were its proper object: but indirectly, as they collaterally fall in, and are joyn'd to that which is its proper object. So that they intend not, that any part of that Authority, which I conceive prejudicial to Princes, and inconſiſtent with Government, ſhould be taken from him, but plainly ſeek to eſtabliſh it, though another vvay; and whereas, Others go plainly to work and tell us,

without

without more adoe, That the Pope is the only Supream Monarch of the Earth; These go a little about the bush, and say indeed, He is not directly Lord of Temporals, but come at last to the same, and tell us, He may as uncontroulably dispose of them as if he were. If this be true, all you have said is to no purpose, and all you can say, while you stick to this, will not absolve you from inconsistency with Civil Government. For 'tis a plain case, If the Pope may interpose in the disposition of Temporals as often as they have relation to Spirituals, that He may interpose alwaies: Since of necessity they must, and cannot but, be alwaies ordered either well, or ill; and both cases belong to the concern of the Soul. And then 'tis all one, as some body in this case handsomly said, whether my eyes be put out by a direct stroke of a Tennis Ball, or by Bricol. *William Rufus* was as mortally wounded by the Arrow which glanced, as if it had been shot directly at him. If Princes may lawfully be depos'd, and their Subjects absolv'd from their Allegiance, and oblig'd to obey the commands of another; and that in Temporals, they are no longer Sovereign, nor absolute even in Temporals; and whether the Power above them be Direct or Indirect, Spiritual or not Spiritual, so it be a Power and can act, they are alwaies unsafe. Pray Friend let me have no dodging. Tell me plainly, Is this the Doctrine of your Church, or is it not? If it be, unless you can shew me, That those can be good Subjects, and true to their Prince who acknowledge another Power, which they are to obey against their Prince; and how that Prince is Supream in Temporals, who has another above him, whose Commands he is to obey in the disposition of those Temporals; or if he do not, his Subjects are not to obey him, I must, for all you have said, continue in my first thoughts, and not believe you tolerable in any Commonwealth. If it be not true, I think you would deserve very well of your Church, to free her from the scandal which the credit of those who hold this, and the countenance she gives them, brings upon her. In all events, I beseech

ſeech you, ſpeak plainly, for elſe I muſt needs think, either that your Church teaches you to hold what you are aſham'd to own, or, vvhich is worſe, obliges you to conceal the Miſchief ſhe teaches, that by the reputation of a fair Outſide you may preſerve your ſelves in a condition to appear to purpoſe, vvhen time and opportunity make it ſeaſonable for her to diſcover her injuſt deſigns. If this happen, I muſt needs profeſs I ſhall have a worſe opinion of your Church than ever I had. For to maintain a falſe or bad Doctrine, which you think to be true or good, is but Errour, a fault, which, unleſs other Circumſtances aggravate the caſe, is very pardonable, becauſe very natural. Men were not men, if they were not ſubject to it. But to teach Wickedneſs, and keep this wickedneſs conceal'd from thoſe who are not as wicked as themſelves; to pretend a ſound Outſide, and carry a rotten heart, has ſo much Malice joyn'd to the Errour, that 'tis abominable in a private man, and I have not a name abominable enough to ſay what 'tis in a Church. After all your brags of Sanctity, I hope you vvill not fall into the woe, which the Goſpel pronounces againſt *Whited Sepulchres, beautiful without, but within full of dead mens bones and filthineſs.* In fine, if you think *Bellarmins* Doctrine true, you have the liberty to make it conſiſtent with Civil Government if you can. I'le promiſe you to conſider what you can alledge as fully and impartially as you can deſire, and give every Argument its full weight. But if you ſay nothing, or dodge it off, which is as good as ſaying nothing, being well enough acquainted with your nature, to know you are not backward to communicate any thing you can to the ſatisfaction of your Friends, eſpecially when it tends to the juſtification of your ſelves, I ſhall know how to ſet the ſaddle upon the right horſe, and without putting you to the confuſion of revealing the ſhame of your Mother, conclude you are forbidden to ſpeak; and, though you were not, allow you do wiſely to ſay nothing, where nothing is to be ſaid that can make for your juſtification. The

Jeſuite

Jesuite *Fisher* was commanded by King *James*, to deliver his Sence of this amongst other Points propos'd to him: And he Answered the rest, but past this over with this plain Confession for his excuse, That he was forbidden to speak of that Subject. If you follow his Example, I shall believe you have one Religion which you publish for your Reputation, and another which you conceal for your Interest. I shall expect your Answer with impatience, and in the mean time remain

*Your*, &c.

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*FRIEND*,

I Must confess I should have thought my self oblig'd to you, if you had dispenst with me in the Question you now propose so pressingly. Hitherto I have said nothing but what the *Fathers* have said for me, and hope if any man dislike any thing, he will consider before he condemn it, what it is to slight and oppose an Authority so venerable. But now I am not only without the support of Authority (for 'tis not to be expected a peremptory decision should be found in the Fathers, of a Question which entered not into the world till a good while after they had left it) but the face of Authority is on the other side: not, but that I conceive the Question fully decided to those who mind Sence, not Words. For it appears very plainly in what I have already produc'd, That the Temporal Power moves in its own sphere, both Supreamly and Independently; which is in truth the whole business. But yet, because this word *Indirect* is not found in the Fathers, 'tis still pretended that the

Question

Question is not decided by them, and those who have appeared against that Power are for the most part *discredited* by Censures, and rendred so unfit to support others, that they have not been able to uphold themselves: In my judgment not without partiality. For they were Men of Learning and Vertue, nor is any thing, that I know, laid to their charge, more then that they thought otherwise in this Point than they think at *Rome*. And yet they at *Rome* at the same time freely communicate with some, who think the same, and publish their thoughts, and own them in the face of the world. However it be, I so much value the content of thinking my thought quietly to my self, and letting others think as they please; of going unregarded on my own road, and let others stray as much as they will, without thinking my self bound to set them right, that I know not any task you could enjoyn me, to which I have a greater aversion. And I must tell you frankly, that were there no more in the case than the bare satisfaction of your curious humour, I would intreat you to satisfie it at some other rate than the quiet of your Friend, and putting him out of his easie road, and setting him to strive against the stream. But, since with a kind of malicious importunity you profess to interpret my Silence to the disadvantage of the Church, I must run the hazard of being perhaps traduc'd my self, rather than suffer her to be so, and think my self oblig'd to sacrifice my Humour and inconsiderable Concerns to Her honour and service. Wherefore, since there is no remedy, but I must swallow this ungrateful Pill; I pray God make it as wholsome, as I find it bitter.

To begin then, 'Tis too much known that there is a Power attributed to the Pope by some, more than is thought due by others, and more than some Popes themselves believe; for 'tis written of *Pius Vth.* that he blam'd the grounds of flattery. These Favourers of the Pope are divided into two branches, Some giving him an absolute Direct Power over all, both Spirituals and Temporals: Others restraining his Direct Power to Spirituals,

but

but extending it to Temporals too, in as much as they have reference to Spirituals. The former is call'd the opinion of the Canoniſts, they being moſt of that Opinion who hold it: the later is the opinion of Divines who generally go this way. Now if there were nothing in the caſe, but the Authority of the Maintainers, and ſtrength of the Reaſons by which they maintain it, People might diſpute with freedom, and let the ſtrongeſt Argument carry it. But Popes have taken part, and own'd this Power; and though they have not determin'd either the way or the thing, yet they take it for granted they have it ſome way, and proceed upon it. By this means it has got the face of Authority, and the univerſal Reverence we bear our Chief Paſtour; as it inclines many to think well of all that is favourable to him, ſo it awes the reſt, who do not, into a ſhineſs of contradicting it. So that of Learned Men, thoſe who write of this Subject write generally in favour of it, thoſe who think otherwiſe, chuſe other Subjects to write of; as in truth, there is but little reaſon to diſguſt Higher Powers meerly to ſhew there Learning. But this reſervedneſs has been ſo much taken notice of, that long ſince it has been thought neceſſary, Learned Men ſhould be conſtrain'd by Oaths and fear of Penalties, *terribilibus comminationibus*, to declare their thoughts of this matter. Poſſibly Intereſt may have had ſome ſhare in this backwardneſs. Men of this ſort of Learning belong moſt to the Church, and may peradventure conſider, that, If they diſpleaſe him who carries the Keys, he may perhaps make uſe of them to ſhut the Gates of Eccleſiaſtical preferment. Beſides, they have been diligent to diſcountenance and ſuppreſs all Books written againſt the Popes Power, ſo that a Private man cannot write without the hazard of a Cenſure on his Book, and poſſibly on his Perſon. Theſe I think are the true Reaſons, I am ſure they are good ones, of the backwardneſs which you phanſie proceeds from a prohibition of the Church, and with a great deal of injuſtice, and no truth, heighten into malice, and the execrable hypocriſie of teaching

two Religions, one to be publiſhed, the other conceal'd, and I know not what; when all this while, I aſſure you, there is no ſuch thing as a Prohibition of the Church, at leaſt that I know of, for any man to ſpeak what he thinks (what *Fiſher* mentions was a private Order made amongſt the Jeſuites, and concerns only themſelves,) but wiſe men are not forward to ſpeak what may turn to their prejudice, nor quiet men to interpoſe in the concerns of higher and the Higheſt Powers, as I conceive, they are not therefore blameable. However it be, He, who from the Sence of thoſe who have vvrit, would infer the Sence of all Learned Men, concludes, in my opinion, very fallaciouſly: Thoſe who Write not, and whoſe Sence we know not, being much more Numerous, and every jot as Learned as thoſe who Write.

But to let that paſs: this Doctrine has found a different reception in the world. The *French*, as their natures are frank and open, without more adoe plainly deny it; and beſides, a great many reiterated Arreſt of Parliament, have ſolemnly condemn'd it in all their Univerſities. In other Countries they are more reſerv'd, and rather oppoſe, the Execution of the Power; than, the Power it ſelf. They let the Pope, and any for him, talk as they pleaſe, but when it comes to Practice, it alwaies proves unjuſt in that particular, and, I believe, alwaies ſhall do. In *Brabant* the Cuſtom is, That all *Bulls* are underſtood of courſe to be Subreptitious, till they be approv'd by the Prince: In other places; they have other expedients: but as far as I ſee, by ſeveral means they all compaſs the ſame end, and admit no more than they think ſtands with their Profit: Only the *French* bluntly tell the Pope, *You cannot*; others uſe ſofter words, but their Actions ſay, *You ſhall not*, farther than we think fit. Now for the Opinion of the *Canoniſts*, ſince Divines univerſally reject it, I may without more adoe reject it with them. Of the other it may be enquir'd, Whether it be of Faith; and, Whether it be True, which are very different Queſtions. And for

Faith

Faith, I positively and freely disclaim it, both because the Maintainers of it themselves confess it is not, and though some are unwary enough to heighten it to that degree, yet they are but few, and their rashness is generally condemn'd as ill grounded, and carried too far. And besides, I see the contrary is openly maintain'd by as numerous and considerable a Member as any belongs to the Catholic Church; and while at *Rome* they condemn *Withrington* and *Barklay*, at *Paris* they condemn *Bellarmin* and *Suarez*. The Pope and the rest of the vvorld knows and sees this, and yet Communicate freely with them, and account them all the while good Catholics. Which is plainly to acknowledge, it is no point of Faith in which they differ, for if it were, they could no more Communicate with them, than with *Arrius* or *Pelagius*; neither is any consideration of their Power, or concern of Policy, able to justifie or dispense with acknowledging him a Catholic, who persists to maintain an Heresie. All the difficulty is, Whether it be true or no. And who am I, that I should undertake to dogmatize in an Age so Antidogmatical, and where no vanity is thought greater than that of Dogmatizing: and this in a Question which has exercised the Wit and Learning of Men esteem'd so great, that to oppose them may chance be counted Arrogance? The most I can do is to tell you what I think, and what I think is, even in my own judgment, so inconsiderable, that I think it a great deal better to play the Historian, than the Disputer; and hope you will be satisfied, if I inform you as much as I know of this Question, and relate the Arguments hitherto produc'd on both sides; at least, as far as I am acquainted with them, and leave you to judge as you see cause. By this means, as you will have all the Information I can give you, so none can rationally blame me for barely relating what every body either knows already, or may know, that will take the pains to look upon what is publickly and every where extant.

But before I begin the Arguments, it will not be amiss to look a little into the Origin of this Dispute, and consider when, and how it came into the vvorld. *Gregory* the VII*th.* was the first that brought it on the Stage. Till his time the Independent Power of Princes was never questioned. They not only quietly dispos'd of Civil matters without controll, except where any notorious Injustice happened (and then both Popes, and other zealous Prelates took the liberty to reprehend, and sometimes Excommunicate them) but had no small share in Eccleſiastical matters, so far as to make Laws concerning them, to invest the Persons duly chosen to Benefices, and confirm the Election even of Popes themselves, which was not held valid without their approbation. Take it in the words of *Onuphrius*, no enemy to this Pope. *Though formerly the Bishops of* Rome *were respected as the Heads of Christian Religion, the Vicars of Christ, and Successors of* Peter, *yet their Authority extended no farther, than either to assert, or maintain the Doctrines of Faith. For the rest, they were subject to the Emperours, all things were done by Their appointment; Themselves were Created by them; neither did the Pope dare to judge, or determine any thing concerning them.* Gregory *the* VII*th. was the First of all the Bishops of* Rome, *who relying on the Arms of the* Normans, *and Wealth of the Countess* Mathildis, *a Woman of great Power in* Italy, *and inflam'd by the discord of the Princes of* Germany *oppress with Civil Wars, contemning, contrary to the Custom of his Predecessours, the Imperial Power and Authority, after he had obtain'd the* Pontificate, *durst, not only Excommunicate, but deprive the Emperour (by whom he had been if not Elected, at least Confirm'd) of his Kingdom and Empire. A thing to that Age unheard of; for, as for the Fables which go about of* Arcadius, *and* Anastius, *and* Leo *the* Iconoclast, *I value them not.* Thus then stood things in the vvorld when *Hildebrand*, Archdeacon of the Church of *Rome*, was chosen to the Papacy in the year 1083, and called *Gregory* the *VII*th. The Contests, which in his daies began betwixt the Spiritual and Civil

Onuph. *de var. Creat.* Rom. *Pont. L.* 4.

Civil Power, are the reaſon, I ſuppoſe, why he is ſo differently repreſented by thoſe who vvrite of him. His Enemies give him the Character of an Imperious, Tyrannical, and ſeveral waies Wicked Man: his Friends on the other ſide praiſe him as much, and affirm he was a man of great Prudence and Vertue, and ſo far, that it hath been atteſted by ſeveral Miracles. And for my own part, I muſt confeſs, I incline to believe well of him. For he had been the ſupport of the Papacy during the time of ſeveral Popes, his Parts and Induſtry having drawn upon him the greateſt weight of all buſineſs, and was ſo far from aſpiring to that dignity, that, if *Baronius* ſay true, He treated with the Emperour not to conſent to his Election, aſſuring him before hand, that if he did, He would be very ſevere againſt the Abuſes practic'd in his Court. Beſides, if *Sigonius* may be believ'd, and the paſſages he relates, vvhich can hardly be read vvithout horrour, the Emperour was a very Wicked Man: but that which concerns this matter was, That all Benefices were, with all the Licentiouſneſs of a depraved Court expos'd to ſale, and He that could Fee a Courtier was vvithout Merit, or even Capacity, poſſeſt of the moſt conſiderable Preferments of the Church. As this vvas a miſchief palpably deſtructive to all Goodneſs, ſo 'tis not incredible from the irregularity of a debauch'd Court. And if the Pope deſir'd to have it remedied, the end he propos'd was but what became him, if the means had been ſo too. I am the more inclin'd to believe this true, becauſe the *Germans* in a great meaſure took part with the Pope, forct the Emperour to comply, and after ſeveral Traverſes, at laſt took the Crown from him, and plac'd it on his Son. However it were, the Emperour, notwithſtanding the Popes Remonſtrances, gives conſent to the Election and confirms him; and the Pope was as good as his word. And firſt Excommunicates thoſe who ſhould receive Inveſtitures of Benefices from Laymen, afterwards the Laymen who ſhould grant them, and laſtly, provok'd by the Emperour, who in a Synod at *Wormes* had

had forbidden Obedience to him, Excommunicates and depoſes the Emperour himſelf. And this is the firſt unqueſtionable Example of this kind, which has appear'd in the Chriſtian World. *Bellarmin* indeed, and his Followers, would make us believe there are Examples more Ancient; but in my opinion he proves them not well, and you ſee *Onuphrius* counts them but Fables: and thoſe of that Age, at leaſt thoſe vvho favoured the Emperour, exclaim'd againſt it as a Novelty unheard of; not to call it Hereſie as one ſaies. But though the thing were now done, it appears not yet in vertue of what Power 'twas done. As that Age was not, I think, extraordinary ſubtle, the diſtinctions of Direct and Indirect Power were not yet found out, and the Pope himſelf ſpeaks in common, *That the care of the Chriſtian World, and Authority to bind and looſe was committed to him; confiding in the Judgment and Mercy of God, and Patronage of the B. Virgin, and ſupported by the Authority* (of SS. *Peter* and *Paul*) &c. but deſcends not to particulars. So that it appears not whether he acted in vertue of a Spiritual or Temporal Power, Directly or Indirectly, and 'tis likely he ſpeculated not ſo far. One thing is pretty remarkable in his ſecond Sentence, for he made two, which ends in this manner: After he had commanded all concerned, to withdraw their Obedience from *Henry*, and yield it to *Rudolphus*, ſpeaking as he does all along to the Apoſtles SS. *Peter* and *Paul*: *You then*, ſaies he, *moſt holy Princes of the Apoſtles confirm what I have ſaid by your Authority, that all men at laſt may underſtand, if you can bind and looſe in Heaven, we likewiſe on Earth may give and take away Empires, Kingdoms, Principalities, and whatever mortals can have.* —— *Let Kings, and all Princes of the World underſtand by his Example what you can do in Heaven, and what power you have with God, and hereafter fear to contemn the commands of the Holy Church. And ſhew this Judgment upon* Henry *quickly, that all Sons of Iniquity may perceive that he falls from his Kingdom, not by chance, but by your means. This nevertheleſs I deſire from you, that by*

*See the words in* Platina.

*Repentance*

*Repentance he may, at your request, find favour of our Lord at the day of Judgment.* For my part I cannot imagine, but a man who ſpeaks thus muſt needs mean uprightly, and think at leaſt he does well. Notwithſtanding the Apoſtles did not do as he deſir'd them. For this *Rudulphus*, after he had fought twice upon equal terms with the Emperour, was overthrown in the third Battle, and ſo wounded in the right hand that he dy'd of it, and dy'd full of Repentance and acknowledgment of his own fault, and the Juſtice of God, who had deſervedly puniſht him in that hand with which he had formerly ſworn Fealty and Service to his Lord. So, that though I believe the Pope thought himſelf much in the right, yet the Court of Heaven thought not fit to grant his Requeſt, but ordered things quite contrary to his expectation and deſire.

The next famous Example is of *Frederic* the *IId.* a Prince of great Power and Parts, who falling out with ſeveral Popes as reſolute as himſelf, after ſeveral breaches at ſeveral times made up, and ſeveral Sentences publiſht, and recall'd, and renew'd again, was at laſt, *with the aſtoniſhment and horrour of all preſent*, ſaies M. *Paris*, ſolemnly Excommunicated and depos'd in the Councel of *Lions*. And this made both Princes and Prelates begin to look about them, foreſeeing, that if this depoſing Power ſhould go on, a ſlight Pretence might at laſt ſerve turn to unthrone perhaps an Innocent Man, and bring the vvorld into confuſion; which poſſibly was the cauſe, the Popes Sentence was not executed. For this *Frederic*, notwithſtanding thoſe proceedings, kept the Empire till his death, which happened long after. But ſtill I ſee not any ground to judge, whether the Power were yet thought Direct or Indirect, and in likelyhood, People had in common a great Veneration for the Supream Paſtour, and his Decrees, and thought them wicked men vvho ſubmitted not to them, but what kind of Power he had, and how far it extended, as far as I can perceive they little conſidered. 'Tis obſervable both in this Sentence, and the former of *Gregory* VII. that

that the Emperour is first Deposed, and afterwards Excommunicated, in aggravation as it were of the former Penalty.

The business was a little more discust in the Contests betwixt *Boniface* the *VIII*th. and *Philip* the *Fair* of *France*. As this Pope is Recorded for a man of more mettle than Vertue, his proceedings were Violent; but having to do with a Prince both Resolute and Prudent, he found but bad success. The Pope perswades the King to an expedition into the Holy Land: to promote vvhich business, He exacts the Tithes of Church Livings in *France*, and reserves the Collation of all Benefices there to himself. The King excuses the one, and plainly denies the other. The hot Pope sends the Bishop of *Apamea* to threaten him with Censures, and Deposition, unless he yielded to him. The King calls the States, and upon Consultation with them, resolves the Legat deserv'd to be imprisoned; but for reverence to the See Apostolic, banishes him, and for his Threats contemns them. The Legat not content to scape scot-free, falls a new to Threats, which the King resenting commits him to custody to the Metropolitan. The Pope complains of the breach of Ecclesiastical Immunity, and commands his Legat should be immediately return'd. These Letters being read in an Assembly of the States, the Count of *Arras*, as hot every jot as the Pope, throws them into the fire. This put the Pope quite out of patience. Wherefore he Cites both King and Bishops to *Rome*, where he had appointed a Synod, and in the mean time declares the Kingdom of *France*, for Contumacy, Felony, and Violating the Law of Nations devolved to the Apostolic See, writing thus peremptorily to the King; *We would have you to know, that you are subject to us both in Spirituals and Temporals —— and who thinks otherwise we repute Heretics.* The King, upon the receipt of these Letters, calls the States again, and by their Advice frames an Answer every jot as smart, and something more homely. *We would have your sooliships know, we are subject to none in Temporals —— and who thinks otherwise we take*

*take for mad men*: And withal appeals to a future General Councel, and objects several Crimes to the Pope, to be made good when the Councel should sit, and in the mean time forbids all intercourse with *Rome*. This Answer being brought to *Rome* by three Bishops deputed for that purpose, the Pope began to be startled, and at last confesses, That to usurp the Kings Jurisdiction belonged not to him; nevertheless that in respect of Sin, the King could not deny but he was subject to the Pope. This put them to examine, how far, and in what manner he was subject to him; and one of the Cardinals in a Consistory, in which the *French* Embassadours were present, resolves the case in this manner: That Supream Dominion belong'd properly to the Pope, but the Administration to Kings; and therefore all Christian Kings were subject to the judgment of the Pope even in Temporals, in regard of his Supream Dominion. But this satisfi'd not the Embassadours at *Rome*; and the States in *France*, resuming the Debate, declar'd positively the King in Temporals was subject to God alone, and ow'd his Crown and Power only to him. Nevertheless, this Subjection on the account of Sin, seems to be the ground of the distinction betwixt Direct and Indirect Power, though I conceive it borrowed from *Innocent* the *IV*th. some time before, upon occasion of a Contest betwixt *John* King of *England*, and *Philip Augustus* of *France*; who prosecuting the King of *England* for default of Homage for some Dukedoms in *France*, &c. King *John* appeals to the Pope; *Philip* maintained, that being a Temporal business he had nothing to do with it. The Pope was willing to favour the *English*, and therefore assumes cognisance of the Cause, upon pretence that there was an Oath in the case, the violation of which being Sin, belong'd properly to his Tribunal. And this Resolution having been put into a Decree, and that Decree into the Canon-Law seems the principal foundation of Indirect Power.

I must confeſs, I do not well underſtand how either this Canon which is in the Decretals, *C. Novit Ille. de Judiciis*; or the other, *C. per Venerabilem. Qui filii ſint legitimi*, which are the two uſually cited both of *Innocent* III. make to the purpoſe. The former was made upon the occaſion now mentioned, and in it the Pope ſpeaks thus: *We intend not to judge of the Fee, whereof the cogniſance belongs to him* (the King) —— *but to decree of the Sin, whereof the Cenſure without doubt pertains to us, which we may and ought to exerciſe on every one.* —— *None of ſound Judgment is ignorant that it belongs to our Office, to correct every Chriſtian for any mortal Sin, and if he deſpiſe Correction, to conſtrain him by Eccleſiaſtical puniſhment*, &c. Where the Pope ſaies *Correct*, the Gloſs adds *Indirectly*, which ſingle word, and that not explicated, is the main Authority for the diſtinction of *Direct* and *Indirect* Power now in queſtion. The other Canon *per Venerabilem* was made upon this occaſion. *Philip Auguſtus* of *France* had put away his Wife, and taken, as I remember, the Counteſs of *Anjou*, and had Children by her. Theſe Children, at his requeſt, the Pope Legitimates, while the ſuit yet depended of the validity of his former Marriage; For the King alledged it was invalid. But as the Example of Kings is apt to be follow'd, Some body leaves his Wife too, and has Children by another Woman, and then ſollicites the Pope to Legitimate them as he had done the King's, The Pope refuſes to yield his Requeſt, but withal owns a Power to have granted it, if he had found it reaſonable, and proves it by ſeveral Arguments; and amongſt other paſſages has theſe words: *We exerciſe temporal Juriſdiction, not only in the Patrimony of the Church (where we have full power in Temporals) but in other Countries alſo, caſually upon inſpection of certain Cauſes.* Theſe *certain Cauſes* the Gloſs interprets to be when He is required. Now both theſe Caſes ſeem to me far enough from the inferring the Depoſing Power, which was not at all in queſtion, but Legitimation in the one, and Cogniſance of a Temporal buſineſs in the other: And though the Pope aſſume both, yet he is very ſollicitous

to

to prove they are within his Sphere, as both may be, and yet nothing follow in behalf of his Indirect diſpoſing. For he may Legitimate Children, in order to Spiritual capacities, and leave them in the ſame condition in which they were before as to Inheritance, and other Temporal concerns. Again, He may Judge of Sin, and puniſh it in his own Court with Spiritual puniſhments, and let Temporal puniſhments alone to whom they belong, the Temporal Magiſtrate. And ſince he expreſly limits himſelf to Eccleſiaſtical puniſhments, methinks it is to ſtrain Logic a little to far to infer out of them, a right to Puniſh by Depoſition.

However, in my opinion, this difference in the manner of Explicating this Power ſometimes *Caſualiter*, ſometimes *Indirecte*, ſometimes *Ratione peccati*, which differ ſufficiently, though they Cite the Authorities indifferently as if they were all one, is a ſign they were at firſt not very cleer in this buſineſs, in Explicating which they hit it no better. Notwithſtanding, the Indirect Power has at laſt got the Vogue, and moſt of the Learned Men who Write in favour of the Pope ſtick to that way. As *Bellarmin* is the moſt famous amongſt them, and moſt at hand, I chooſe his Arguments, believing as he was a Man of great Reading, he fail'd not to make uſe of all that was conſiderable in thoſe who Writ before him, and ſeeing, thoſe who Write ſince borrow moſt from him. He has Five in his Book, *De Rom. Pont.* and Four in his Anſwer to *Barklay*. The Firſt are Anſwered by *Barklay*, and better by *Withrington*, and every one who Writes of this Subject takes notice of them. In Anſwering I make uſe chiefly of *Withrington*, inſerting only upon occaſion what I find in others. Only to indulge ſomething to my fancy, and eaſe it of the grievous pain of Tranſcribing, I neither tie my ſelf to the order, nor preciſeneſs of the Arguments, but make entire Arguments of themſelves, what the Author meant ſometimes a proof of ſome part of an Argument going before. While you have the Subſtance I hope you will allow me a little Variety for my own eaſe.

*Bellarmin* then, After he had taught against the *Canonists*, That the Spiritual and Civil Power are in themselves distinct, and have different Offices, different Ends, &c. yet when these two meet together, then he affirms they make but one Commonwealth, in which the Spiritual Power is superiour to the Temporal. *For*, saies he, *there cannot be two Heads, and therefore one Power must of necessity be subject to the other, when they both Club into one Commonwealth. But this they do where the Law of Christ is receiv'd. For we being many are one Body in Christ*, Rom. 12. *And in one Spirit we were all baptiz'd into one Body.* 1 Cor. 12. *And because the Members of the same Body must depend one of another, and Spirituals cannot be said to depend on Temporals, Temporals must depend on Spirituals, and be subject to them.*

To this they Answer differently. Some granting the Spiritual and Temporal Power make but one Commonwealth, affirm the Members independent one of another; as the Hand depends not on the Foot, nor the Foot on the hand, but each free and absolute in their proper Functions, are subject only to the Supream Head *Christ*. Others, in my opinion more rationally, deny the Two Powers club into one Commonwealth, and say, The Spiritual makes one, and the Temporal another, and so many others as there are Independent Heads of this Power. That the same men in different respects make both these Bodies; and that as Clergy, and Laity, and all, not excepting the Prince himself, in as much as they are Faithful, are subject to the Spiritual Power, according to the nature of Spiritual Subjection; so the same Laity and Clergy, not excepting the Pope himself, in as much as they are Citizens and parts of the Temporal Commonwealth, are subject to the Temporal Power; that is, for as much as concerns the Law of God purely, and abstracting from Humane Constitutions, and such Changes as time has brought into the World. For now the Pope is himself an absolute Prince, and other Clergy Men have Priviledges and Immunities justly belonging to them. When therefore

fore 'tis assumed that the Church is one Body, they distinguish this word *Church*, and say if it be taken Formally, that is, the Faithful under the notion of Faithful, then indeed they make but one Body; but neither doth this Body include both Powers, for 'tis only the Spiritual to which they are subject as Faithful; as Citizens, they belong to the Temporal. But if the word *Church* be taken Materially, for the Men which make up the Church (an Acception something improper, but yet such as comprehends both Powers) then say they, In this sence the Church is not one Body but two, or if you will twenty, as many as there are several Supream Temporal Powers in Christendom; One *Spiritual* in relation to the Spiritual Power, and which is properly the Church; The rest *Temporal* in relation to their several Temporal Heads. And this Answer, as it seems fair in it self, and justified by the sence and apprehension of Mankind (for *France* and *Spain*, for example, both acknowledge the Pope, and are both parts of the Church, and that one Body of which the Apostle speaks; but he that should therefore think them not to be Two distinct Bodies, and Independent Commonwealths, would be thought something extravagant.) so 'tis a little more strongly inforc'd against *Bellarmin* by other parts of his own Doctrine. For he teaches elsewhere, That Church-men, besides that they are Church-men, are also Citizens and parts of the Civil Commonwealth, and that all Members of every Body must be subject to their respective Head: That the Civil and Spiritual Power are in their nature distinct Powers, and have distinct Offices and Ends, *&c.* and that Christ did distinguish the Dignities and Offices of Pope and Emperour, that one should not presume upon the Rights of the other; That Christian Princes, as well as Infidels, acknowledge no Superiour in Temporals, since Christ took not away the Rights of any, and a King by becoming a Christian loses no Right he had before, and the like. Besides, this Answer seems wonderfully strengthned by some Authorities mentioned in the

the former Letters. Such as *Gelasius* to the Emperour *Anastasius*. *The Prelates of the Church owe you all Obedience.* And again: *The Bishops themselves are to obey your Laws, and that, because there are Two principal Powers by which the World is Governed, the Sacred Authority of Bishops, and Regal Power.* Likewise Pope *Anastasius* to the same Emperour. *Bishops are subject to the Laws of the Prince in what concerns Public Discipline, and Princes to Bishops in the dispensation of the Mysteries and Sacraments,* according to the famous Canon of *Leo* the IV. Nos si incompetenter. *It is to be noted that there are Two Persons by which this world is governed, The* Regal, *and* Sacerdotal: *as Kings are Chief in Worldly, so Priests in Divine matters.* —— *Therefore* David, *though by his Regal Unction he were over Priests and Prophets in affairs of the World, yet was under them in those of God.* Much more might be alledged on this Subject, but this I conceive is enough to shew the Answer given to *Bellarmin*, has the support of Authority as well as Reason.

A Second Argument is from the ends of both Powers, *whereof one being Eternal, the other Temporal happiness; because the Eternal happiness is the Supream and Last end of all things, Temporal happiness must be subordinate to it: And because, according to* Aristotle, *where the Ends are subordinate, the Faculties likewise are subordinate, the Civil Power which aims only at Temporal happiness must be subordinate, and subject to the Spiritual, which looks after Eternal.* This Argument they Answer likewise two waies; First by granting the whole, which they say concludes nothing against them. For admitting the Temporal Power to be subordinate to the Spiritual, nothing follows more than than 'tis under the other according to the Order which the other has over it, which is by the way of Instruction, and Perswasion, and Direction, not by way of Compulsion; For that belongs not to Spiritual Power. Let the Prince, say they, in Gods name, be Instructed by the Prelate to do well, and Admonisht, and if it be seasonable, even vvith Spiritual Censures be Corrected if he do amiss: all this may be, and is done by zealous

Prelates

Prelates without prejudicing the Authority of the Prince. But if they proceed to Authoriſe his Subjects to throw off their Obedience, then they exceed, ſay they, the bounds of their Spiritual Power, and intrench upon another which belongs, not to them, but the Prince, and in which he is ſubject neither to them, nor any body, but God. Another way they Anſwer, by denying the Ends of thoſe Two Powers to be ſubordinate one to the other. For the Laſt end of every Power is its proper act, as Sight is the laſt end of the power to ſee, and Reliſh of the power to taſte, and ſo Temporal Happineſs of Temporal Power. Indeed he vvho has Temporal Power, ought to have, and has if he be a Chriſtian, a farther end and aim at Eternal happineſs, both in the uſe of his Temporal power, and all the Actions he does. But the end of the Power is one thing, and the end of Him that has the power another. Wherefore though the Man be ſubject, his Power is not. Eternal happineſs is indeed his own laſt end, but the laſt end of Power is Peace, and the quiet ſecurity of his Subjects, nor is there any other end to vvhich his Power is ordained. *Bellarmin* againſt *Barklay* endeavours to make this Argument good, by the Subjection which all Arts in a Commonwealth have to the great Art of Governing; where the Painter, the Muſician, the Mariner, and the reſt, are all directed, ſo to uſe their ſeveral Arts, as is moſt fitting for the end of the Prince, and good Government, vvhich is Superiour to them all: And as theſe are ſubject to the King, and muſt obey vvhat he preſcribes even in the Uſe of their Arts, ſo King and all, ſaies he, is ſubject to the Pope as He who profeſſes the higheſt of Arts, the bringing Souls to Heaven, by vvhich all inferiour Arts, and their Uſe, is to be regulated. They Reply, that this rather confirms than oppoſes what they ſay. Thoſe Artiſts are indeed all ſubject to the Supream Artiſt the Prince, but as Citizens, not as Artiſts. The Men are ſubject to him, and obliged to obey his Commands even in the Uſe of their Arts, but their Arts have not therefore any ſubordination to

his

his Art. The Ends of Arts or Faculties, ſay they, are then ſubordinate when one is deſigned for the ſervice of another. As the Brick-maker to the Maſon, the Sadler to the Horſe-man, and the like. For if there were no Houſes, nor Riding, Bricks and Saddles would be uſeleſs. In theſe caſes the Faculties are ſubordinate becauſe the Ends are ſo, and the Brick-maker muſt receive directions from the Maſon how to make his Bricks, and the Sadler from the Rider, what kind of Saddle to make. But that a Painter ſhould be inſtructed by the Governour how to manage his Colours, or a Muſician his Proportions, or that theſe things have any dependence on the Art of Governing, they think a fancy a little unſuitable to *Bellarmins* Learning. *Ariſtotles* Rule then, ſay they, is very true; And Faculties are ſubordinate, where the Ends of them are ordained one for another: but vvhere the Ends are Ends of the Men, and not of the Faculties, there is no colour to alledge it. And ſo it happens in this caſe, For though Eternal happineſs be the Laſt end of all men, yet 'tis no more the end of Temporal Power, than Taſte is the end of ſeeing, or Sight of taſting, both which the man makes uſe of to his own good, but they are independent and unſubordinate one to the other. So as the Painter and Muſician are ſubject to the King as Citizens, not as Artiſts; ſo the King is ſubject to the Pope, not as King, but as Chriſtian, and no otherwiſe ſubject than as Chriſtianity obliges him, with vvhich it may very vvell ſtand, That vvhile He is ſubject to the Pope in *Spirituals*, the Pope may be ſubject to him in *Temporals*.

Another Argument is, from the Perfection of Commonwealths, and conſequently the Church in as much as it is a Commonwealth. *Every Commonwealth*, ſaies Bellarmin, *muſt have Means ſufficient to attain its end, and the End of this Spiritual Commonwealth, which we call the Church, being the Salvation of Souls, the Church were not perfect in her kind if She wanted ſufficient Means to bring men to Salvation. And becauſe Wicked Princes may be a great obſtacle to the Salvation of Souls, the Church would want*

*ſufficient*

*ſufficient Means to attain her End, if She had not Power to remedy this inconveniency, and Depoſe them when they are Incorrigibly obſtinate.* This Argument, to ſay the truth, they handle a little ſeverely. And firſt they make *Bellarmin* himſelf anſwer it, putting inſtead of *Wicked Princes, Wicked Popes*, and then making uſe of it vvith as much efficacy to conclude that the Church has a Power to Depoſe Wicked Popes. But this he will by no means admit, and can therefore tell us, *It is no wonder if in that caſe there be no efficacious Humane remedy in the Church, ſince its ſafety principally depends, not on Humane induſtry, but the Divine protection, Its King being GOD; Wherefore, though the Church cannot Depoſe the Pope, yet it can, and ought, pray that God will provide a remedy. And 'tis certain that God will take care of her ſafety, and either Convert, or take away, ſuch a Pope before he have ruin'd the Church.* Now, they conceive People may as well have recourſe to God for remedy againſt a Wicked King, as a Wicked Pope, and that He can as vvell hear them. However, want of efficacious Humane remedies in ſome caſes, is acknowledged by *Bellarmin* to be no Argument of Imperfection in the Church, and therefore they think he might well have ſpared his pains in this particular. And, ſince the ſafety of the Church depends on the Protection of God, they conceive it in very good hands, and that there is no great danger the Wickedneſs of any Prince will prove more powerful than his Goodneſs, to which the ſafety of the Church may very ſecurely be truſted, without any neceſſity of a Remedy worſe than the Diſeaſe. But they go farther, and ask, if this Power of the Church be ſo fully ſufficient to bring men to Salvation, how it happens that there is ſo much Ambition, and ſo much Covetouſneſs, and ſo much Gluttony, and ſo much Concupiſcence of the Fleſh, and of the Eyes, ſo much Pride of life ſtill left in the vvorld? For theſe things are great hinderances to Salvation, and the Church ſeems deficient in her Duty if She take them not away when ſhe can. Again, Why does not the Church, with her

*L. 2. de Concil. c. 19.*

ſufficient Power, cleer the World from Mahumetiſm, and Infidelity, and Idolatry, which likewiſe are main obſtacles to Salvation, and provide for the ſafety of ſo many Millions as are loſt by them. Farther, Amongſt Chriſtians, A man commits a mortal Sin, and runs mad upon it, Has the Church ſufficient Power to reſtore this man to his Wits, that he may Repent and be ſaved? Can She hinder Abortions, and bring all Children alive to Baptiſm? And twenty other ſuch Croſs Queſtions they put. But to Anſwer the Argument more preciſely: They conſider this ſufficient Power in the Church, either in order to it Self, or in order to all things neceſſary to the Effect. Conſidering the Power in it ſelf, it is abundantly ſufficient for as much as is required on that ſide; but, becauſe to the Effect many things are required beſides ſufficient Power, or Efficacy in the Cauſe, as that the Subject be fitly diſpoſed, the Cauſe duly apply'd, *&c.* they ſay, a Defect in theſe things argues no inſufficiency in the Power, and the Power may be very ſufficient for as much as belongs to the Nature of Power, and yet the Effect not follow for want of ſome diſpoſition in the Subject. For Example, The Sun has ſufficient Power to enlighten the whole World, the Fire has ſufficient power to burn that ſtack of Wood, though the Sun cannot level a Mountain, which intercepts the courſe of his beams, nor the Fire has hands to bring the Wood to it, or legs to carry it to the Wood. Wherefore, they ſay, The Church has Power abundantly ſufficient to bring Men to Salvation, for as much as is requiſite on the part of Power, but 'tis a wild conceit to think She can remove all obſtacles which Nature or Chance caſts in her way to hinder the exerciſe of that Power. And if one of thoſe Obſtacles happen to be the Wickedneſs of a Prince, the Churches ſufficient Power to Save men can no more take Him away, than the Suns ſufficient power to ſhine level a Mountain. What her ſufficient Power, or Means to Save men are, we may learn from thoſe who certainly beſt know the end of the Church, and Means to attain it, the firſt Planters of Chriſti-

anity;

anity; who by there Example have inſtructed us, That efficacious Preaching, and more efficacious Living according to the Holy Doctrine they Preach'd, Charity, and Patience, and humble Zeal are the ſufficient Means which have prevailed upon the Converted vvorld, and when they are in Gods fit time duly apply'd, vvill be as ſufficient for the reſt. In the mean time we may learn of *Bellarmin*, that God vvill have a care of his Church; and, whatever he think, muſt think our ſelves, That Prayer is as good a remedy againſt a Bad Prince as a Wicked Popes: And therefore that Propoſition, which aſſumes that a Depoſing Power is neceſſary, or that the Churches Power would be Inſufficient without it, they flatly deny.

From the ſame Head *Bellarmin* Argues again. *Every Commonwealth, becauſe it has Power ſufficient to preſerve it ſelf, and bring its Subjects to Temporal happineſs, may command another Commonwealth, which is not ſubject to it, to ceaſe from doing injury to her, and hinder her from the proſecution of her juſt Ends, and if it refuſe to Obey, may Depoſe the Prince of it, and ſet up another who will be more juſt, in caſe there be no other way to avoid wrong from it. Therefore much more may the Spiritual Commonwealth command the Temporal, which is ſubject to it, and Depoſe the Prince, in caſe She cannot otherwiſe compaſs Her End, the Salvation of Souls.* And this Argument they treat not more favourably than the former: For they ſay firſt, It aſſumes plain Contradiction, vvhen it puts two Commonwealths both independent and free, and yet puts a Power in the one to command the other, which is to make that other Subject, and not Free. Again, It aſſumes without any reaſon, and againſt all Truth, That the Temporal Commonwealth is ſubject to the Spiritual, which they will by no means admit, unleſs perhaps of a Spiritual Subjection, and that too of the perſons as Faithful, not as a Commonwealth, in which reſpect every abſolute Commonwealth is abſolutely free from all Subjection to any but God. Farther, they retort it as the former, and ſay, It concludes as well a Power in the Temporal Commonwealth

over the Spiritual, as in the Spiritual over the Temporal. For, ſay they, The Temporal is a perfect Commonwealth too, and has Power ſufficient to attain its End. Wherefore, if the Spiritual hinder her in the proſecution of Her ends, She may command the Spiritual Commonwealth to ſurceaſe; and if the Spiritual Prince prove Diſobedient, depoſe him and ſet up another, ſince the Spiritual Commonwealth is as ſubject to the Temporal in Temporals, as the Temporal to the Spiritual in Spirituals. But, to Anſwer the Argument more directly, they deny that this forcible proceeding, of one Independent Commonwealth with another, argues any Superiority or Subjection in either. What they do in this kind, if it be well done, being juſtified by the force of Nature, and light of Reaſon, and lawleſs Law of Neceſſity, vvhich teaches Force to be then fitly us'd, when nothing but Force will compaſs an End, otherwiſe neceſſary. Otherwiſe this kind of Power, is no other than a Strong man has to take away the Purſe of a Weak one: and there is no doubt but whoever has it, may, if he vvill, make uſe of it, and ſo the Pope, if he be ſtrong enough, may certainly Depoſe a Prince, as a Prince may a Pope. But, they wonder *Bellarmin* ſhould be ſo little conſiderative, as inſtead of a Power of juſt Authority, to talk of a power of Strength, in which they think he has done the Church but little ſervice; for if She come to vye with Princes in this kind of Power, the Material Sword, which belongs to them, will, in all likelyhood, wound the Spiritual Outward-man more ſenſibly, than the Spiritual Sword will the Carnal man. Mean time, they conceive he takes a bad Method to conclude an Authoritative Power in the Church, by the example of a Power in Commonwealths, which is not Authority but Strength.

Another Argument *Bellarmin* makes from the obligation of Chriſtianity, in this manner. *It is not lawful for Chriſtians to endure an Infidel or Heretic Prince, if that Prince endeavour to draw his Subjects to Hereſie or Infidelity. But it belongs to the Pope to judge whether he be guilty of ſo drawing*

*drawing them or no, wherefore to the Pope it belongs to Judge whether he ought to be Depoſed or no.* Becauſe he could not but foreſee his firſt Propoſition would be deny'd him, he provided Proofs; which before I meddle with I muſt inform you what they ſay to thus much of the Argument, for they are no where ſmarter. This, ſay they, is without more adoe, to put all Kingdoms into the Popes hands, and make him as Abſolute as the moſt extravagant of Canoniſts can fancy him. For ſince there are but two things conſiderable in the caſe, Whether an Opinion imputed to a Prince be Hereſie or no? and, Whether he hold it or no, and would introduce it among his Subjects? If both theſe depend on the Popes Judgment, and his Judgment be irrafragable, the ſafety of all Princes lies in his breaſt, and no Prince can be longer ſecure of his Crown, than he is of the Popes favour? For the Pope may proceed to Judgment when he pleaſes, and if he be to be obey'd let him Judge how he pleaſes, No Prince can be a Prince longer than he pleaſes. For put the caſe, ſay they. To deny in the Pope a Power to Depoſe Princes is an opinion, which may, by this Rule, be declared Hereſie, whenever the Pope thinks convenient. The King of *France*, for Example, himſelf holds that Opinion, and endeavours his Subjects ſhould do ſo to. This King therefore, and I believe it will go as hard with all the reſt, is Depoſable if for no other reaſon, yet for thinking himſelf not Depoſable. And ſo, all Kings are without more adoe at the Mercy of the Pope. If they acknowledge themſelves Depoſable, they grant the Power, and are beholding to him that he puts it not in Execution, if they deny it, for that very reaſon they are to be Depoſed, and are again more to thank him that he does not Depoſe them, when they deſerve it. To this particular then of the Popes Judgment, If it be underſtood of a Natural Judgment, others, ſay they, may Judge as well as the Pope whether the Prince deſerve to be Depos'd or no, and thoſe who live upon the place better, as having better information from their Eyes and Ears, than

than he can have from the Report of others. But if it be underſtood of an Authoritative Judgment, ſuch whoſe Sentence obliges People to the Execution of it, they deny the Pope, or any elſe, has any Authority to Judge, in that manner, of the Behaviour of Princes. For, ſay they, the Authority of every Judge, is confined to his proper Tribunal; a Judge of Aſſize is no Judge in the Spiritual Court, nor is a Biſhop a Judge of Aſſize. Now the Pope's is a Spiritual Tribunal, and in that he may, in fit circumſtances, judge even of Princes, and condemn them, if they be faulty, and award Spiritual Penalties againſt them. But if he proceed to Temporal Puniſhments, he paſſes to a Tribunal in which he is no Judge, nor his Sentence ſo given more to be obey'd than that of a Court Marſhal in the Common Pleas: And to ſay otherwiſe, were to take all Judges, and all Tribunals out of the vvorld, beſides his own. For there is no Action but if well done belongs to Vertue, if ill, to Vice; And He being as much Judge of Vertue as Vice, as of Hereſie and Faith, there is no Action nor can be, which by this account does not belong to his Tribunal, and ſo all other Judges are uſeleſs. For the reſt, they flatly deny the firſt Propoſition, and affirm, Subjects are ſo far from being obliged not to endure an Infidel, or Heretic Prince, that they are oblig'd to Endure and Obey him too, not ſo far indeed as to turn Infidels or Heretics for his ſake, nor ſo far as not to repreſent his Errours or Miſcarriages to him in that dutiful manner which is allowed by the Law, and their Allegiance; but, for the reſt, let him be never ſo much an Infidel or Heretic, He is ſtill their Prince, and as ſuch to be obey'd.

*Bellarmin* proves he may not from *Deuteron.* where the *Jews* are forbid to chooſe a King who is not a *Jew:* And this ſeems a little far off. For if in *Poland*, for Example, the Law were to chooſe only a *Polander*, or in *Germany* a *German*; this might very well be true, and withal be little to purpoſe. But yet he brings it nearer. *The Reaſon of this Law*, ſaies he, *was, leaſt by chooſing a Stranger, they*

*they might be brought into Idolatry. But there is the ſame danger, and the ſame miſchief in chooſing a Prince who is not a Chriſtian, and remaining ſubject to one who becomes no Chriſtian, therefore Chriſtians are bound to Depoſe a Prince who deſerts Chriſtianity, and endeavours to pervert his Subjects after him.* This Argument, ſaies the other ſide, makes nothing for the Pope: It may ſeem to countenance the pretenſions which Rebellious People make to a Power over their Kings; for thoſe are they who Chooſe, and by Conſequence are to Depoſe, if this Argument hold; but the Pope has no more to do with the one than the other, or if he have he has as much right to Chooſe as Depoſe. For the *Law* then, they acknowledge the Reaſon, aſſigned by *Bellarmin*, is in likelyhood true: but when he aſſumes that the caſe of not Chooſing, and not Obeying a Prince already choſen, or otherwiſe in Lawful poſſeſſion of the Principality, is equally miſchievous, they think him wonderfully out. Before he is Choſen, he is no Prince, nor have the People any tye to him, and while they are at their Liberty they will not do well to Chooſe ill, and ſubject themſelves to a Bad Man. But when he is once Choſen, or otherwiſe eſtabliſht, they are no longer Free, but Subject, and that for Conſcience, neither have they any other part in the diſpoſition of the Commonwelth but Obedience. This Prince, though Election were the means by which he got his Principality, yet has it now, and that by Divine Right, and is truly the Vicar of God, whoſe particular Commiſſion for his Depoſition unleſs it can be produced, thoſe who reſiſt him *reſiſt the Ordinance of God, and acquire Damnation to themſelves.* A Man does ill who chooſes a Bad Wife, and is bound by the law of Reaſon to chooſe a Good one: But can he therefore caſt her off when he has her, and becauſe he did amiſs in taking a Scold, do worſe in leaving her? The Cardinals are bound to Chooſe a Good Man for Pope; if they chooſe a Bad one, or he become Bad after his Election, *Bellarmin* will not therefore allow them to Chooſe another. And yet his Argument is every jot as efficacious in that caſe

caſe, as in that of Bad Princes. A Bad Pope may do as much miſchief as a Bad Prince, and if the danger and miſchief be equal to Chooſe him, and Obey him, the Pope is as fully confuted as the Prince. But that *Bellarmin* ſhould impoſe upon them that the miſchief of Chooſing, and not Depoſing is equal, and make it a kind of known Principle too, and ſuch as needs no proof, they take very unkindly at his hands. For if they refuſe to chooſe a Bad Man, there is no miſchief at all, nor injury ſo much as to him who is refuſed. But if a Prince once lawfully Eſtabliſht be afterwards caſt out, there follows Bloodſhed, and War, the Hazard, perhaps the Ruine of the Commonwealth. So that his equal Caſes put the greateſt miſchiefs that can be on one ſide, and none at all on the other, which is a very partial, and ſomething unequal equality: or elſe, they make the Diſturbance and Hazard of the Commonwealth no miſchief, which, that *Bellarmin* ſhould go about to perſwade them, argues, he had more confidence in his Logic, than they have Opinion of his Judgment. 'Tis great pity this Doctrine, if it be true, was not in faſhion a little ſooner, the Ignorance of it coſt the life of many a good Chriſtian, and the Bloud of abundance of Innocent Men, ſhed in Ten Perſecutions, might have been ſaved, if the firſt Maſters of Chriſtianity had Inſtructed People a little better, and made them underſtand the convenient uſe of their Power. For it had been but Antidating a little the courſe of Providence, and ſetting up a Chriſtian Emperour in the place of *Nero* or *Diocleſian*, and all had been well: And 'tis a little ſtrange thoſe Primitive Chriſtians, whom none ſuſpects of want of Zeal, either underſtood, or practis'd their duty no better.

Neither the one nor the other ſaies *Bellarmin*: but the Reaſon why they Depos'd not *Nero* and *Diocleſian*, and the Apoſtate *Julian*, and *Valens* the Arian, was, becauſe they wanted Force. *For that they wanted not Right nor the Knowledge of it, is apparent by the Apoſtle, who,* 1 Cor. 16. *bids the Chriſtians appoint New Judges, and if they could make*

*New*

*New Judges, they might as well have made New Kings if their Force had been equal to their Justice.* But certainly some body is extreamly out, *Bellarmin* or his Adversaries; for they affirm very confidently, that the Primitive Christians were not so weak and helpless as he pretends. S. *Peter* himself liv'd in *Nero*'s time, and he had power to restore the dead to life, and cast the living into sudden death. A body would think this was Power enough in conscience, and that *Nero* with all his Guards and Legions was not more secure of his Empire against this miraculous and unresistable Force, than *Ananias* of his life. It was not then for want of Power that he taught Christians to be subject to the King as most excelling, *&c.* and choose to lay down his own life amongst the rest, rather then practice an expedient which *Bellarmin* thinks so necessary, and which to him had been easie enough if he had been of *Bellarmins* mind. But to speak only of Humane Power, *Tertullian* liv'd in those daies, and Writ what he saw and knew; He affirms the contrary to what *Bellarmin* thinks very plainly, *Apologet.* C. 37. *Should we want Numbers or Forces if we had a mind to be open Enemies, not secret Revengers? Are the* Moors, *and* Marcomans, *and* Parthians, *and whatever Nations of one place, and confin'd to their own Limits, more than those of the whole World? We are but Men of yesterday, and yet have filled all the places you have, your Cities, Islands, Castles, Burroughs, Councels, and Camp it self, your Tribes, Courts, Palaces, the Senate and the Market. We have left you only the Temples. For what War are not we fit and ready, even though we were Inferiour in Number, who endure death so willingly, if in this Discipline it were as lawful to Kill as to be killed,* &c? *Eusebius*, Writing of the times before *Diocletian*: *Who shall describe*, saies he, *the numerous Congregations and multitudes of meetings in every City, and the open concourse to Oratories, for which not content with the Ancient Buildings, they in every City set up spacious and Large Churches from the very Foundations.* L. 8 c. 1. A thing testifi'd by *Maximinus* himself, who saies to *Sabinus*, that *Diocletian* and *Maximinian* commanded Chri-

 stians

ſtians to be proceeded againſt because they ſaw *Omnes ferè mortales*, All men generally, leaving the Worſhip of the gods, unite themſelves to the Chriſtians. The Army of *Julian* too was almoſt all Chriſtian, ſay Hiſtorians, in ſo much that when *Jovinian* choſen Emperour after his death, ſhew'd a backwardneſs to his Election, as being himſelf a Chriſtian, and unwilling to take the Command of Men accuſtomed to Wickedneſs under *Julian*, they all cry'd out, *He ſhould not doubt, and refuſe a Command not Wicked. That he ſhould be an Emperour of* Chriſtians, *and Men brought up in Diſcipline and Piety, which the Elder of them learnt of* Conſtantine, *and the Younger of* Conſtantius, *and that if* Julian *had circumvented ſome, he liv'd not long enough to ſettle the Miſchief.* S. *Auſtin* too teſtifies of them, that *They could at their pleaſure have depoſed* Julian, *but would not, becauſe they were ſubject for Neceſſity, not only to avoid Anger, but for Conſcience and Love, and becauſe our Lord ſo commanded.* And abundance more they alledge in this kind.

*Euſeb.* L. 9. C. 9.

*Theodor.* L. 4. C. 1.

*In* Pſal. 124.

To the Proof which *Bellarmin* brings from 1 *Cor.* they Reply, That ſince the Chriſtians had Force enough to Create New Judges, they ſee not why they had not Force enough to Create New Kings too. And the truth is, if the Judges meant by the Apoſtle, were ſuch as could claim and exerciſe the Authority, inveſted in thoſe who were appointed by the Prince, it was little leſs than to ſet up New Kings, or at leaſt deprive their Old of a good part of the Subjection due to them. For he that refuſes to ſubmit to a Magiſtrate Commiſſionated by a Prince, makes more bold with the Prince himſelf than is conſiſtent with the duty of a Subject. For ſince the Inferiour Judge has his Authority from the Prince, to refuſe it is in plain terms to refuſe the Authority of the Prince. Which the Apoſtle, they think, was far enough from Authorizing, or even perſwading, Chriſtians to do. They conceive then, that what the Apoſtle did in this caſe, is no more than what Good

Judges

Judges ought to do at this day, it being no unusual thing for them to wish the parties not to expect the Rigour of the Law, but compound their Differences fairly amongst themselves, to which purpose they either Assign, or leave them to choose Umpires themselves. Yet, all this while never intend, by their Charitable Compassion, to forfeit their own Right, or debar the Parties from having recourse to them again, if the other Method proves not to their satisfaction. Such, say they, was the Apostles meaning in that place. He desired to prevent, as much as might be, all Contentions among the Faithful, at least the Scandal of their breaking out, and being taken notice of in the Courts of Heathens. To this purpose he wishes them to keep their Frailties from becoming public, and if they could not avoid Contentions, at least to end them by the Judgment of Men chosen amongst themselves; but never intended to invest the Men so chosen, with an Authority any way prejudicial to that of the lawful Magistrate. Even now, say they, the Apostles whether Counsel or Command is still in force, and People do ill who expose their Frailties to the knowledge of Public Courts; notwithstanding, if they will needs go to Law, Courts have their full Power now as they had then, and as much as if S. *Paul* had never written any such thing. By the Judges then mentioned by the Apostle, they understand *Umpires* chosen among themselves to prevent the Scandal of Public Suits, but without any Authority derogatory to the Public Magistrate, and alledge from S. *Thomas*, That if the Faithful had been forbidden to appear upon Summons before the Tribunals of Infidels, it had been against the subjection due to Princes, and contrary to the Command of S. *Peter*, *Be subject to every humane Creature, to the King as precelling, and to the Rulers as sent by him.* *Bellarmin* cannot digest this *Umpirage*, but persists against *Barklay* to maintain they were True Judges, yet withal confesses they had no Coactive Power as to the External Court, and that Christians were obliged, when ever Cited at the Suit, either of Infidel or Chri-

ſtian, to anſwer before the Legal Magiſtrate; becauſe, ſaies he, they were not Choſen by conſent of the Contending Parties alone, but appointed by the Church. But this, I think, makes them no other than bare Umpires; for ſuch they are. and are ſo eſteemed among us who are often appointed by our Courts to decide particular Differences. And all the obligation to ſtand to their Award, was, for ought appears, the obligation of doing what became Chriſtians, whom S. *Paul* in that place, and our Saviour before him had inſtructed *Not to contend in Judgment, but part with the Cloak too to him who would take away the Coat.* And this Obligation, for ought I know, continues ſtill, and Law Suits are a blemiſh to the perfection of Chriſtianity even at this day, where men ſhould do a great deal better to decide their differences by a Friendly Compoſition, than loſe ſo much time, and undergo ſo much Trouble as is required to follow the Law. But if either We now, or They then, are not ſo perfect as we ought, but will have recourſe to Magiſtrates, there is nothing in S. *Paul* which hinders their Juriſdiction. Mean time I conceive, the difference betwixt a Judge and an Umpire, is, that one has Power to execute his Sentence, the other not; wherefore *Bellarmin* may call them what he pleaſes, but if they had no Coactive Power, as he confeſſes they had not, they were not what our, and I think all Languages, properly call *Judges.* This Argument then ſeems to come off lamely enough, while it ſuppoſes the Primitive Chriſtians wanted Force, againſt the plain teſtimony of Primitive Chriſtians themſelves; and would prove a right to ſet up New Kings, by ſetting up New Judges, vvhich Judges had not that Power vvhich is neceſſary to a Judge, and makes his proper diſtinction from an Umpire; however, vvhich did not prejudice the Authority of the Legal Magiſtrate. In ſhort, it amounts to this, Chriſtians are now free from Subjection to their Princes, becauſe S. *Paul* adviſed them heretofore to do ſomething which did not take away their Subjection to Inferiour Magiſtrates.

Perad-

Peradventure a ſecond Proof may be more lucky, which *Bellarmin* makes in this manner: *To tolerate an Heretical Prince, is to expoſe Religion to moſt evident danger. For ſuch as the Ruler of a City is, ſuch will be the Inhabitants.* Eccleſiaſtic. 10. *But Chriſtians ought not to tolerate an Infidel Prince with evident peril of Religion, becauſe where Divine and Human Laws are oppoſite, we muſt obey the Divine Law. And the Divine Law obliges us to preſerve the true Religion, Human Law only to have this, or that Man for King.* And to ſay truth, *Bellarmin* is a little more lucky than ordinary; for his Adverſaries, beſides vvhat he Cites from Scripture, grant him at leaſt one Propoſition, namely, That the Law of God is to be prefer'd before the Law of Man, and they hit it ſo ſeldom, that 'tis well they agree in any thing. But then they deny all the reſt, and affirm, that to tolerate an Infidel King, is not to expoſe Religion to evident danger; That Chriſtians ought be ſubject to the Prince God has ſet over him, whatever he be; That there is no Contrariety betwixt the Law of God, and the Law of Man in this caſe; and laſtly, That our Subjection to Princes is not only by Human Law. And while they are in ſuch an humour of Contradicting, 'twas great luck that *Bellarmin* could get any thing granted. For the firſt, they ſay, *Bellarmin* forgets himſelf and his Doctrine elſewhere. When 'twas for his purpoſe he could acknowledge, that *The ſafety of the Church depends, not on Human Induſtry, but, the Divine Protection, and that he will be ſure to take care of her, and provide Remedies againſt all miſchances which may befall her.* And they think, if *Bellarmin* be forgetful, there is no great fear that God will be ſo too, or danger that any Wickedneſs will prevail againſt the Power of Omnipotent Goodneſs. For what greater danger is there in theſe later daies, more than in the former, when for Three hundred years together Princes, not only were Infidels, but employ'd all their Power and all their Induſtry to root out Springing Chriſtianity out of the World. Notwithſtanding which, the Church continued, and increaſed, and prevail'd at laſt. So that,

if

if a King happen to perſecute the Church, to think, as *Bellarmin* ſeems to do; that all is preſently loſt, is to rely on the Arm of Fleſh a little more than becomes a good Chriſtian, and to diſtruſt either the Power or Goodneſs of God, and beſides, manifeſtly to contradict the Evidence of Hiſtory. And for the ſecond, That People may not tolerate an Infidel Prince, becauſe that would expoſe Religion to evident Danger. This Tolerating of a Prince ſeems ſomething an unmannerly phraſe for Subjects. A Prince may, when he ſees fit, Tolerate the unwaywardneſs of his Subjects, and not puniſh all the faults he ſees. But for Subjects to Tolerate their Prince is an expreſſion hardly tolerable. They are to obey him, not in his Infidelity, which 'tis permitted them even to oppoſe by all the dutiful means conſiſtent with the Fidelity of good Subjects, but in the reſt to refuſe Subjection, is no leſs than to acquire damnation. However, *Tolerating*, ſay they, ſignifies not Acting, *Expoſing* ſignifies Acting; and that *not-doing* ſhould be thought *Doing*, they apprehend very ſtrange. Yet, if any Inconvenience follow from not Acting, it is then only imputable to him who Acts not, when He is otherwiſe obliged to Act. And no man can be oblig'd to Act, but where the Action is Juſt and Lawful. Now Rebellion, and Tumults, and Murther, and ſuch Actions as thoſe of neceſſity muſt be, by which a Lawful Prince is reſiſted by his Subjects, till *Bellarmin* have prov'd Juſt and Lawful Actions, they think, they may ſafely deny, any apprehended danger of Religion will juſtifie thoſe who do them. If any harm come, they are all accountable to God who do it; the People who do Nothing have nothing to Anſwer for, unleſs it be blamable to truſt Gods Providence, and not to intermeddle without ſufficient Cauſe, a ſufficient cauſe of Condemnation. If the Laws of God did warrant the Interpoſing of the People, ſomething might be ſaid for them; but ſince they do not; their part is to do their Duty in what concerns them to do, and rely upon God for the reſt. Then for the Contradiction between the

two

two Laws: The Divine Law, saies *Bellarmin*, obliges us to preserve the True Religion, Human only to have this or that Man for King. Where is the Contradiction, say they? Cannot I keep this Man for my King, and keep my Religion too? A body would think that this is very possible to be done. The contrary to that Divine Law is, You shall not preserve the True Religion; and if any Human Law command this, Disobey freely in God's name, for *Æquum est obedire Deo magis quam Hominibus.* But while you disobey this Law, which you cannot without offending God obey, do not refuse to acknowledge your Prince, and obey him there, where you offend God if you do not obey. Again, the contrary to what he calls the Human Law is, You shall not have this or that Man for Prince, or, which is all one, You shall not obey him in just Commands. *Bellarmin* has not yet produc'd any Command of the Divine Law which saies this, nor will, till Rebellion become a part of Gods Law. In fine, Whoever persists to put a contradiction betwixt Fearing God and Honouring the King, will be Confuted by all the Bells in the Parish. Lastly, Whereas he makes it only by Human Law that this or that Man is King, they Reply, what you have more at large in a former Letter, That He becomes King, as the Pope becomes Pope, by Human means; but when he once is so, Obedience to him is by Divine Right, and so, if there be any contradiction betwixt Preserving our Religion and Obeying our Prince, the Divine Law contradicts it self. For as Preservation of Religion is Divine Law, so Obedience to Princes is Divine Law too. If *Bellarmin* be not pleas'd with these Answers they leave him to make better himself, retorting, as they are very good at Reparty, his Argument against a scandalous Pope; for he, say they, exposes Vertue to evident danger; For such as the Ruler, such will be the Inhabitants. And Gods Law is to be observ'd when 'tis contrary to Human Law, and Gods Law obliges us to preserve Vertue, and 'tis by Human Law only that this or that Man is Pope, *&c.*

And

And ſo we come to another Argument from the parity betwixt an Infidel Prince and an Infidel Husband, whom the Apoſtle allows the Faithful Wife to leave, and therefore, Why are not the Faithful People as free in reſpect of an Infidel Prince? In Anſwer to this they Diſpute ſeveral things with exactneſs enough, and examining the particular Caſes where, and how far, and why Divorce is lawful, find ſeveral Diſparities, and ſeveral Reaſons why the Argument concludes not. But to leave thoſe Conſiderations, which are not without their perplexity, this Reply of theirs ſeems very plain. Bring, ſay they, a Permiſſion from the Apoſtle for a Subject to deſert his Prince, as plain as this is for a Woman to leave her Husband, and we vvill acknowledge the caſe is equal. The Apoſtle plainly derogates from the general Rule, and brings an Exception wherein the Law of Marriage binds not. He that was ſo careful of Private concerns, cannot be imagined unmindful of Public and greater. Had he known any Exception from the general Rule of Obeying Princes, it is not to be ſuſpected he would conceal it, and teſtifie more care for Private Families than Commonwealths. So that the Argument amounts to this: We are free from the Law in caſes where the Law is diſpenſt with, therefore we are free likewiſe where 'tis not diſpenſt with. Again, ſay they, the Woman is only then free when the Man refuſes to live vvith her, for if he ſtay S. *Paul* wiſhes her to ſtay vvith him. Now if any Prince refuſes to Govern his People, unleſs they vvill become Infidels like himſelf, I think they will allow the People are not obliged to turn Infidels for his ſake, but may get them another in caſe he leave them. But if the King will ſtay with his People, ſince the Woman is to ſtay with her Husband who vvill be with her, they think the very parity concludes the People oblig'd to ſtay vvith their Prince. Otherwiſe the parity ſtands in this manner: Even as the Faithful Woman is not to leave her Unbelieving Husband who vvill continue vvith her; even ſo, the Believing People are to leave their Unbelieving

King

King who vvill ſtay vvith them. Or, even as the Believing Woman is free from an Unbelieving Husband who caſts her off, even ſo the Beleiving People are free from an Unbelieving King vvho does not caſt them off. Which methinks are ſomething unlike for Parities.

The next Argument is of great eſteem with *Bellarmin.* He made it in his Book *De Rom. Pont.* and repeats it in *Tortus*, and urges it largely againſt *Barklay.* This it is: *Princes are receiv'd into the Church with this either expreſs or tacit bargain, to ſubmit their Scepters to Chriſt, and preſerve and defend their Religion, and this under penalty of forfeiting their Kingdoms if they fail. Wherefore, if they become Heretics, or an obſtacle to Religion, they may without injury be Judged and Depoſed by the Church. For he is not fit to receive the Sacrament of Baptiſm, who is not diſpoſed to ſerve Chriſt, and loſe all he has for his ſake, according to S.* Luke 14. If any one comes to me, and hates not Father and Mother, *&c.* he cannot be my Diſciple. *And the Church would err too grievouſly if She admitted a King who without Controul would cheriſh Hereſie, and overthrow Religion.* Thus Argues *Bellarmin* in *Rom. Pont.* C. 24. But againſt *Barklay* more largely. *Let us imagine,* ſaies he, *an Infidel Prince, deſirous to be receiv'd into the Church, ſhould ſpeak in this manner: I deſire to become a fellow Citizen with the Saints by Baptiſm, and promiſs to ſubmit my Scepter to Chriſt, and defend his Church to my power, and never to break my holy purpoſe. Nevertheleſs, If I happen to break my Word, and become an Heretic, or Apoſtate, or Pagan, I will not be puniſht with Temporal Puniſhments, either by the Church, or its Preſident, or any but Chriſt; and if the Chief Governour of the Church ſeparate me from the Communion of the Faithful, I will nevertheleſs that the Faithful Sons of the Church continue Faithful Subjects to me, and may not be abſolved from the bond of their Obedience by any. Such a King,* ſaies he, *if* Barklay *think fit for Baptiſm, wiſe men would laugh at him. For if a man ſhould deſire to be incorporated into any City, and ſhould proteſt that if he had a mind to betray that City, he would not be*

*judged by the Magiſtrates of it, but by the King who dwells far off, every body would laugh at him. And truly He that, according to the Goſpel, ought be prepar'd to loſe his life for the Faith of Chriſt, ought more to be prepared to loſe an Earthly Kingdom. But 'tis ridiculous to ſay, I am ready to be depriv'd of my Kingdom, if I renounce my Faith, but not by any Sentence of Man, but will have Sentence pronounct againſt me by the Angels in Heaven. The Church would be very imprudent to receive into her boſom a Man who would, without controul, afflict the Members of the Church, and not ſuffer the Faithful to be freed from his Tyranny by any Authority on Earth.* Thus *Bellarmin*; more zealouſly than wiſely ſay his Adverſaries. Such fine diſcourſes never vvere, nor are ever likely to be made but by the King of *Utopia*. Kings vvho receive Chriſtianity think not of ſuch ſubtleties, nor imagine they are to treat with their Spiritual Inſtructors vvith thoſe nice Cautions, which they uſe in making Leagues, and Treaties of War and Peace with their fellow Kings. To make Proteſtations, and other proviſions of Security, againſt Chances they never do, and none but a man cunning in *Chican* ever would think of, as if Baptiſm were a bargain made in Law, wherein, if by misfortune the Writings be not exactly drawn a man forfeits his Title to his Purchaſe, or a man becomes liable to Eternal damnation for the fault of a Scrivener, is a conceit of a more ſubtle reach than is like to proceed from the ſimplicity with which men deal in the concerns of Eternity. However, if *Bellarmin* do put ſuch thoughts into the head of a Pagan, he may very juſtly proteſt: I deſire to be made a Chriſtian, and intend to live like one, and ſubmit to the Diſcipline of that Law which I am going to imbrace: but I mean to keep my Regal dignity and Prorogatives inviolate, and do not intend to be put by Baptiſm into a worſe condition than now I am in. My Subjects are now my Subjects, and I intend they alwaies ſhall be ſo. For my ſelf, if I deſerve it, I refuſe not to be expell'd from that Society of which I ſhall have made my ſelf unworthy;

unworthy; But as I had my Subjects before Baptism, I will not that Baptism shall take them from me. I am a King while I am no Christian, and if I cease to be a Christian, will not therefore cease to be a King. God, not Baptism gave me a Crown, and none but God shall take it away. A Pagan, say they, may warrantably declare thus much, and warrantably even according to *Bellarmin* himself, who teaches that the Law of Christ deprives no man of any right, and when a King becomes Christian he loses no Right or Dominion, but gets a new right to the Kingdom of Heaven, for else the Benefit of Christ would be a prejudice to Kings, and Grace destroy Nature. As for the Comparison betwixt him who pretends to the Freedom of a City, and him who pretends to Baptism, the Protest which *Bellarmin* enters in his behalf is indeed ridiculous, and overthrown by his very pretence; for a Member of a City must, by his very being a Member, be subject to the Laws and Magistrates of that City; And so a King, if he become a Member of the Spiritual Commonwealth, becomes subject to the Laws, and Magistrates, and Punishments of that Commonwealth, which are Spiritual, and may be inflicted on a King as well as other men (considering their own Natures purely, and abstracting from Circumstances, which in the case of Kings are generally such, that, if it be lawful, it is seldom expedient to use them) but for Temporal punishments, He is himself the Head of that Commonwealth which should inflict them, and must either punish himself, or cannot be punisht but by God; So that to say, by his becoming a Member of the Spiritual Commonwealth he makes Himself liable to Temporal punishments, is to say, in the Case of him who pretends to be made a Citizen, That by making himself a Member of that Corporation he subjects himself to the Laws of another.

But to leave these speculations to them who Write of New *Atlantis* and the Isle of *Pines*; The Argument, say they, is doubly faulty, for it assumes what is not true,

and concludes what does not follow though the Antecedent were true. First, they deny any such bargains are made in Baptism. There is indeed an express, whether Promise, or Purpose to Renounce Satan and his Pomps, but of Renouncing the Right of Kings, there is not any expression vvhich sounds like it; and for secret bargains, they are so secret, if there be any, that they are known to none but *Bellarmin*. They have lain hid for many Ages, and do so still, for any credit they give this Argument. He would infer it out of the disposition which our Saviour, in S. *Luke*, requires in him, who vvill be his Disciple. And this disposition of preferring his Love and Service before all things, they acknowledge is necessary in Baptism, and that Man unfit for it, vvho does not firmly purpose so to do. But the Question is, If the King chance to break his good Purpose, is He therefore liable to this particular punishment of being Depos'd? This particular Condition must enter into the bargain, or nothing will come of it. Otherwise our God-fathers and God-mothers have undertaken for all of us, that vve shall do all that the greatest King Promises in Baptism. And we all forfeit the Surety they have given, and break the Promise solemnly made in our behalf, and sin daily and grievously. Can we therefore without injury be turn'd out of our Estates? We must be prepar'd as vvell as any King, to lay down our lives for the Faith of Christ; if for Fear, or other frailty, we fall even to Idolatry, is it therefore lawful to knock us on the head, or if it vvere, Can the Church or Priest, before whom vve made this Promise which vve have broken, give Sentence of bloud against us? How justly soever we deserve to be punisht, yet this punishment is not just, because we never submitted to it in Baptism, or any other way; and if we did, the Church, of all the vvorld, can the least inflict it. But the truth is, no such punishment vvas ever thought of, either by the Givers or Receivers of Baptism. If vve do not continue constant to our Renouncing of Satan, Satan vvill take possession

ſeſſion of us again, to whom the Church may, vvhen there is juſt occaſion, by her Power deliver us. And, if Satan be not puniſhment enough even for a King, and the Wickedeſt King that ever was or will be, I am mightily miſtaken. *Bellarmin* therefore vvas leſs conſiderative than vvould be expected, when he talks every where as if Kings, unleſs they were liable to be Depos'd, would be vvithout puniſhment. Methinks Excommunication might ſerve turn, Excommunication vvhich as himſelf ſaies, is a puniſhment greater than Temporal death. It being more horrible, as himſelf Cites S. *Auſtin* to be delivered to Satan by Excommunication, than to endure the Sword, or Fire, or be devoured by Wild Beaſts. *Death* is the laſt of puniſhments with us of the Temporal form, and if a Wicked Prince may be puniſht by the Church with a puniſhment worſe than Death, I know not vvhy the charitable Anger of a Churchman may not be ſatisfied vvith it. However it be, according to *Bellarmin* himſelf, *Excommunication is the moſt grievous puniſhment which the Church can inflict: when ſhe has proceeded ſo far, She has no more to do*, ſaies *Cœleſtin.*3. Wherefore if Depoſition be a thing with vvhich the Church has nothing to do, *Bellarmin* may be content, if that be not done which cannot be done, and e'en ſubſcribe to *Pet. Gregorius*, teaching as learnedly as honeſtly, that *Rebellion againſt Princes, upon pretence of their Vices, cannot ſcape the Crime of Treaſon and Indignation of God, and thoſe who reign wickedly are rather to be left to the Judgment of God, than the hands of Subjects be polluted with Sacriledge and Parricide. God wants not Means when he pleaſes either to amend, or take away ſuch Bad Princes.* But to return to the Argument, They poſitively deny any bargain at all made in Baptiſm, unleſs you vvill call the Purpoſe they make to live Vertuouſly an expreſs bargain, and a ſubmiſſion to the Law vvhich the Baptized embrace, and conſequently to the puniſhments of it,

L. 3. de *Laic.* C. 2.

*De Eccleſ.* C. 6.

L. 26. de *Repub.* C. 5.

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an implicit one; as indeed, who is once Baptized, vvhether Prince or Private man, may upon occaſion be Admoniſht, and Reprehended, and Cenſured by the Church, but if Human frailty, and the Temptations to vvhich our Nature is ſubject, make a Prince break either this Bargain or Purpoſe, that he ſhould therefore be content to be Depoſed, or that he Bargains to ſubmit to any ſuch Penalty, they flatly deny, and ſay, that by the ſame Reaſon, ſince every Private man makes the ſame Bargain in Baptiſm which any King does, every Man that Sins might preſently without injury Done him, have his Eſtate Confiſcated, or be ſent to the Galleys or the Gallows: Which would make ſtrange vvork in a World ſo frail as ours. And for this Reaſon they deny the Conſequence, as vvell as the Antecedent of this Argument. For, ſay they, although a Prince ſhould bargain to forfeit or Crown or Life, if he forfeit his Faith, unleſs he bargain expreſly that the Church or Pope be Garranty of this Treaty, and give them power to proceed to Depoſition in caſe of Failer on his part, nothing is done, and they have otherwiſe no power to do it. For all the Power they receiv'd from God is Spiritual, and is not to meddle with matters ſo Temporal. So that a King muſt not only ſubmit to the Churches Power, but create in her a Power vvhich God gave her not, or nothing vvill come of it.

Upon the whole they ſay two things which ſeem remarkable enough. Firſt, that this claim from Bargain or Promiſe, whether expreſs or tacit, plainly evinces there is no Internal proper Power in the Church to Depoſe Princes, for then there were no need of this External Right by bargain; beſides, that if ſuch Power accrue to her, as it cannot be other than according to the expreſs Terms of the Contract, ſo it vvould not be Indirect, as *Bellarmin* pretends, but as Direct as can be imagined; there being in the World no Power more Direct than I have over thoſe things for which I have bargain'd. Next, they ſay, that *Bellarmin* manifeſtly contradicts what

what other Divines, and himself with them, teach of the Nature of the Promise made in Baptism. *Suarez* observes, that this Promise is not to be understood a proper Promise or Vow made to God, but only an Obligation which the very Profession of Christian Religion made in Baptism induces, by reason of the Divine Law, and Power granted by Christ to his Church. Which I take to signifie, Whereas in things in which we are otherwise free, we can oblige our selves by Vow or Promise (as when I Vow to give Alms, or do any other good Work) and this Vow induces an Obligation which otherwise I had not; but in things where we are otherwise obliged, if I Vow to perform them, I am oblig'd to no more by my Vow than I was before; that the Promise made in Baptism is of this second sort, and People were oblig'd to the performance of the Christian Law then receiv'd, although they made no promise so to do. So *Bellarmin* elsewhere teaches, *That the promise, made in Baptism, is nothing but a testification, or acceptation of the Obligation, which the Law of God brings with it* —— *Neither are the Baptized bound to any, either Explicite or Implicite intention of obliging themselves farther, than as they are oblig'd by the Law of God.* And farther, *That Baptized Christians are forced by the Church to keep the Laws of Christ, not so much in virtue of their Promise, as out of this that they are become Members and Children of the Church, and every Member is subject to the Head, and every Child by the Law of Nature to his Parent.* Wherefore manifestly, either the Law of God obliges Princes to submit to Deposition without any bargain of theirs, or this Bargain he talks of leaves them as free as they were before. If the Law obliges them, 'tis to no purpose to mention Bargains; if it do not, 'tis to no purpose neither, since their Bargain signifies nothing, for they bargain no farther than to observe the Law. And the Argument amounts to this; They bargain to be Depos'd, because they bargain to observe the Law which obliges them

*De Monach.* C. 19.

them to no ſuch thing. Beſides, if we examine a little more narrowly, and ask by what Law of God Princes become liable to Depoſition, *Bellarmin* Anſwers 'tis by Bargain, which is not to be liable by the Law of God: And if we ask again vvhere any ſuch Bargain appears, He tells us, 'tis not an Expreſs, but a Tacit Bargain, imply'd in the Law of God; which is plainly to prove the Bargain by the Law, and the Law by the Bargain; and, that is ſuch a kind of Argument as, I think they call a Circle, but ſure 'tis none of the beſt, nor needed have been ſo much eſteemed by *Bellarmin.*

There follows an Argument which you had light upon, and propos'd to me vvith ſo much ſmart Rallery in a former Letter, from the Compariſon of the Chief Poſtour in the Church to a Shepheard. Which in ſhort is this. *When it was ſaid to S.* Peter *Feed my Sheep, all Power was given him which is neceſſary to a Shepheard in regard of his Flock. But a Shepheard muſt have Power againſt Wolves and Rams that they hurt not the Sheep, and Power to provide, as is convenient, for the Sheep themſelves.* Then applying the Notions of all Three by ſimilitude to Princes, as you have formerly obſerved, he concludes *The Pope has Power over them in reſpect of every one.* They Anſwer, there is more wit than ſolidity in this diſcourſe, Similitudes of all other being the worſt Topies, and which affords the weakeſt Arguments, as ſeldom running, in the School Phraſe, of all Four. The Metaphor is generally, and more fitly underſtood, ſo that by *Wolves* are meant *Perſecutors*, by *Rams* the *Prelates* of the Church, and by *Sheep* the reſt of the *Faithful.* But allowing him to uſe the Similitude as he pleaſes, and apply it after his own faſhion; to talk vvith him in his own language, they obſerve many differences betwixt a figurative and real Wolf, a figurative and real Sheep, and many defects in the Similitude, and Reaſons vvhy the Argument concludes not, even keeping vvithin the terms of the Metaphor. But to conſider the Thing; Here, ſay they, the Church is compar'd to a Flock, as it vvas before to a Common-

Commonwealth, and may to be a City, or Family, or Ship, or Army, or twenty things more. All these several Comparisons make no difference in the things compared: For, whether you consider the Pope as Prince of a Spiritual Commonwealth, or Shepheard of a Spiritual Flock, his Power as Prince is not different from his Power as Shepheard, but the same, and if you consider it according to all the Comparisons, of which it is capable, 'tis still one and the same, and that a Spiritual Power. Wherefore all the Similitudes, that are or can be, will never make it other than it is; and the Pope, whether he be lookt upon as a Prince, or a Shepheard, or a Pilot, or however he be considered, can do no more than a Spiritual Prince, and a Spiritual Shepheard, *&c.* Now when *Bellarmin* Argues, the Pope is a Shepheard, and a Shepheard may drive away or kill a Wolf, and an Infidel Prince is a Wolf, all this, say they, even allowing the Comparison, is to be understood of Spiritual driving away, and Spiritual killing. But when he infers, Therefore he may Depose him, he passes from Spirituals to Temporals, and leaves his Allegory and the truth too. The Pope may Admonish and Command the Flock not to follow the Wolf in what he is a Wolf, but in what he is not a Wolf, but a Shepheard himself, what ever the Pope say to the contrary, they are bound to obey the Power which God has set over them. It is by Divine Law that Subjects obey their Prince, and Princes cease not to be Princes by turning Infidels, nor Subjects to be Subjects by becoming or remaining Faithful: And that all the Similitudes in the World should dispense with the Law of God, *Bellarmin* may talk as long as he will, but they will not believe him.

For the rest these kind of Arguments, if too much credit were given to them, would make mad work. Every Bishop, and every Curate is as truly a Shepheard as the Pope. Their Flocks indeed are not so large, but they are truly Flocks, and suffice to denominate their Governours with propriety Shepheards, If this quality

enable him who has it to Depoſe a Prince; there is no remedy but every Biſhop has Power to Depoſe the King who is of his Dioceſs, and every Curate him who belongs to his Pariſh. And ſince Private men have ſomething leſs Title to their Eſtates than the King to his Kingdom, if Kings be ſubject to this Power, Private men are much more; and ſo, becauſe the Argument with a little more ſtretching would reach to every Sin, within a little while every Sinner might be diſpoſſeſt of his Eſtate at the pleaſure of his Biſhop or Curate; which in time would make ſuch work, that People would go near to hate all Arguments, and all Scholars for *Bellarmins* ſake, and as the *Turks* do, Forbid all Learning that they may live in Peace and Security. Beſides, if the fancy ſhould take a man to apply this very Allegory to Princes; for if it were ſaid to S. *Peter*, *Feed my Sheep*, it was of *Cyrus*, I ſay to *Cyrus*, *Thou art my Shepheard*. *Iſay* 44. and of *David*, *Thou ſhalt feed my People* Iſrael, 1 *Paral.* 11. and then apply this Notion of the Wolf, and furious Ram, to a wicked ſcandalous Pope, over whom he muſt have Power if he cannot otherwiſe preſerve his own Flock; *Bellarmin* muſt either unravel all he has weav'd here, or Princes will have more Power over Bad Popes than he will think fit to allow them. In the mean time, of the two waies by which he ſaies in *Rom. Pont.* his Doctrine may be prov'd, Reaſons and Examples, Theſe are all he produces of the firſt kind. You will judge of them, while I paſs to the other.

He brings in all Twelve, Two in the Old Law, and Ten in the New. Thoſe of the Old are *Ozias* depos'd for Leproſie by *Azarias*, and *Athalia* by *Joiada* for Idolatry. Of theſe two, one was never Depoſed, and the other never a Queen, but by Uſurpation. *Ozias* for his Preſumption was miraculouſly ſtruck with Leproſie, and by the Prieſts according to their duty, and the command of the Law, put out of the Temple, and ſeparated from the People: but, for the reſt, continued King till his dying day, his Son ſupplying his place in what his Diſeaſe permitted him

him not to interpose himself. *Athalia* endeavoured to settle her self in the Kingdom by the Murther of all the Children of *Ochozias*, but was mistaken. *Joas* was saved by his Aunt *Jeboseth*, and, by the honesty and credit of her Husband *Joiada*, put in Possession of the Regal Dignity, whereof the Right had been in him all the while. So that the Argument from this Instance stands thus. The High Priest amongst the *Jews* was instrumental in placing his trueSoveraign in his Throne, therefore the High Priest among the Christians may tumble a lawful Soveraign out of his Throne, which for a man of *Bellarmins* Vogue is something odly Argued.

His Third Example, and First from the New Law, is, the dealing of S. *Ambrose* with the Emperour *Theodosius*, whom, after a Cruelty commanded by him in a transport of Anger, he admitted not into the Church, till he had Repented, and make satisfaction. I know not, but methinks he makes the most unpromising entry into his business that may be. In the former Instances, one had no Deposition, the other, no Lawful Prince to be Depos'd, and in this there is neither Deposition, nor Pope to make it. S. *Ambrose* was Bishop of *Milan*, not of *Rome*, and I hope he will not extend this Deposing Power to every Bishop. However, what he did, not only every Bishop, but every Ghostly Father, may do both lawfully and laudably. It is the Office of Churchmen to induce Sinners to Repentance if they can, and perswade them to those Remedies which may hinder them from relapsing into the same faults; And they have here the Zeal of an excellent Prelate, successful with an excellent Emperour, for their encouragement; and this is all I can perceive in this passage. The Fourth is a Priviledge of S. *Gregory* the Great to a certain Monastery in which there is this Clause; *If any King, Bishop, Judge,* &c. *violate this Decree, of what Dignity or Degree soever he be, let him be depriv'd of his Honour.* This they take to be a form of Imprecation, not a Legal Decree, as when he saies a little after, *And let him be damn'd in the lower Hell with* Judas *the Traytour,*

&c. or as the ſtile of *Bulls* now is; *Let him know he ſhall incur the Indignation of God*, &c. For they think, that for the Pope directly to command People ſhould be damn'd, is not very commendable in him, nor very wiſe in any who ſhould think he does ſo. Wherefore to look upon theſe kind of expreſſions as other than Threats, by which men may be frighted from Wickedneſs, they conceive is both againſt S. *Gregory*'s Sence, and Common Sence too. The next is the Example of *Gregory* the Second, who forbad Tribute to be paid to *Leo* the *Iconoclaſt*; and this is one of thoſe Stories which *Onuphrius* reckons amongſt Fables, and *Platina* expreſly denies, for he ſaies the *Italians* were ſo exaſperated againſt the Emperour, that the Pope was feign to interpoſe his Authority to keep them from chooſing another Emperour. So that till the matter of Fact be agreed, 'tis an uncomfortable and uſeleſs Employment to buſie our ſelves with thinking what will follow out of it. There follows the Depoſition of *Childeric* King of *France* by Pope *Zachary*, with vvhich they make quick work, and poſitively deny it; not that the King was Depos'd, but that he was Depos'd by the Pope. The *French* indeed conſulted him (as they might have done any other, whoſe Credit they had thought uſeful to their purpoſe) vvhether were more truly King, He who managed all the Affairs of the Kingdom, or he who had the bare Title, but medled with nothing: And He anſwered the former. And this was all he did, for the reſt, what was done, was done by the *French* themſelves. Not but that 'tis likely, he underſtood well enough the meaning of the Queſtion, and was inclin'd to favour *Pepin* all he could, but he did no more; and thoſe who did, have long ſince given account to God of their action. I know not of what humour the *French* were in thoſe times, but he that ſhould at this day maintain in *France*, The Pope has Power to Depoſe their King, would go neer to be confuted with a Halter. The Seventh and Eighth Examples are, The Tranſlation of the Empire to the *Germans*, and ſetling the Electours who are to chooſe the

the Emperour. This is a Queſtion of vvhich *Bellarmin* has written Three entire Books, and is of more both importance and labour than to be treated with any exactneſs in a Letter. That which *Withrington* Anſwers is in ſhort, That the Pope concurred to the Tranſlation of the Empire, and Nomination of the Electours, not as acting by his own ſole Power, but as one who, for the place he held, had much, and perhaps more Intereſt in the buſineſs than any other. To which purpoſe he Cites *Mich. Coccinius*, ſaying, that *The People of* Rome, *and the reſt of the Nations of* Italy *oppreſt by barbarous People, and not only not protected by the* Grecians, *but ill uſed too, and afflicted by their Avarice and Imperious humour, transfer'd the Empire from the* Grecians *to the* Germans *in the perſon of* Charles *the Great. And 'tis not to be doubted,* ſaies he, *that this Tranſlation was made, and had its force and efficacy from the Conſent and Authority of the People of* Rome *and the reſt of* Italy. *And whereas* Innocent *the Third Writes to* Bertoldus, *That the Apoſtolic See transfer'd the* Roman *Empire from the* Grecians *to the* Germans; *We do not grant the Apoſtolic See transfer'd it otherwiſe, than by Conſenting to thoſe who did, or by declaring it ought be transfer'd, but the Tranſlation had its force and ſtrength from the Conſent of the People.* To which purpoſe he alledges alſo Card. *Cuſanus*, ſpeaking in this manner: *Whence the Electours ordain'd in the time of* Henry *the Second by common Conſent of all* Germans, *and Others ſubject to the Empire, have their Radical Power from this common Conſent of all, who by the Law of Nature could chooſe themſelves an Emperour not from the Pope, in whoſe Power it is not to give a King or Emperour to any Country in the World, without its Conſent. But to this concurr'd the Conſent of* Greg. *the Fifth as of the ſingle Biſhop of* Rome, *who for the Degree in which he is, has an intereſt in Conſenting to the Common Emperour. And rightly; as in General Councels His Authority concurs in the firſt place by Conſent with all the reſt who make the Councel; the force nevertheleſs of the Definition depends, not on the firſt of all Biſhops, but on the common conſent of all, both of him and the reſt.* This is

what

what they say; How far it is to be allow'd is another Question. The Origin of Empires, and Rights of Princes, are things I have more disposition to admire and reverence, then Dispute. In the mean time here are Eight of his Twelve Examples, which you see are all Contested, how rationally you will judge. Those which follow are of *Gegory* the *Seventh*, who Deposed the Emperour *Henry*, and Three Popes more who followed his Example; to which he might have added several other, it being acknowledged that after *Gregory* the *Seventh* had once begun, many have imitated him, and almost all claim'd a Power to do so. But as He was the first unquestionable Author of that till then unknown Fact, so they maintain, that Fact was unjust in him, and not allowable in any of his Successours. They Answer then first with *Jo. Paris. That Arguments are not to be drawn from such singular Facts, which proceed sometimes from Devotion to the Church, or from some other Cause, and not from Order of Law:* And with *Greg. Tholos. From hence I gather only, that 'tis a difficult Question, Whether Popes can Depose Emperours or Kings, who formerly had Power to make Popes? Besides, there are found divers Depositions of Popes by Emperours, as well as of Emperours by Popes, so that there has been a great Vicissitude in these things. Whence 'tis a bad way of Disputing to argue from Fact, and the Examples of Deposition.* —— *Out of all which, Ambitious disturbers of the Commonwealth, Usurpers of Kingdoms, and Rebels to their Lawful Princes may gather first, That every Deposition of Princes is not therefore just, because it has been done, for all Facts are not just; and secondly, That no such Consequence ought to be made, there is an Example of such a thing, therefore the like may be attempted again.* And in the words of *Bellarmin* himself, *De* Rom. *Pont. L* 2. *C* 29. speaking to the Instances in which Popes have been Depos'd by Emperours. *Such things*, saies he, *have been done, but how justly let them look to it.* —— *'Tis plain that* Otho *the First Depos'd* John *the Twelfth with a good Zeal, though not according to knowledge, for this* John *was one of the worst Popes that ever*

*ever was. And therefore no wonder if a Pious Emperour, as this* Otho *was, but not so skillful in Eccleſiaſtical Affairs conceiv'd he might be Depos'd, eſpecially ſince many Doctors thought ſo as well as he. For 'tis one thing,* ſaies he in *Tertus, to bring Examples of Kings* (ſaies he, of Popes, ſay they.) *and another to prove their Power and Authority.* Secondly, They Anſwer, that if it be a good Proof that a thing may lawfully be done, which has been done before, the Wickedeſt things in the world may be prov'd Lawful. People may lawfully Rebel, Public and Private Faith may be broken, Commonwealths may be overturn'd, *&c.* for all theſe things have been done. And without more adoe Popes may be Depos'd by Emperours, as well as they by Popes, for that has been done too. Laſtly, and with a little more ſmartneſs, They ſay this way of Proof plainly begs the Queſtion, and aſſumes the very Point in Diſpute. *Bellarmin* affirms, and his Adverſaries deny, the Pope may juſtly Depoſe Princes; now to Argue, *He has Depos'd them therefore He juſtly may*, aſſumes, That what he has done is Juſt, which is the very Point they Conteſt with him; and therefore think it had been ſomething ſhorter, and altogether as much to purpoſe, to have ſaid, *'Tis juſt becauſe 'tis juſt.* Every body knows Popes have both challenged and uſed a Depoſing Power, but every body is not ſatisfied that this Power is juſtly due to him. *Bellarmin* undertakes to prove it is, and brings for an Argument, That he has us'd it, which no body denies, and would have that conclude, That therefore he juſtly may, which if his Adverſaries had thought a good conſequence they had not put him to the trouble of making it. For they knew and acknowledged the Antecedent enough before. But they think the Popes did amiſs who did ſo, and if barely ſaying that they did the thing, be proving they had right to do it, they confeſs they are in the wrong; but if it be not, *Bellarmin* is ſo, and ſhould have conſidered that barely to ſay his Tenet over is a kind of Proof which takes with none but very good natur'd people,

People, and as far as I see his Adversaries are a little more stubborn.

I am so weary with long Writing, that I must intreat your permission to refer what remains to another opportunity. I will hope I have said enough to quiet your suspicions, and am sure I have said so much that I need some quiet my self, and must take leave, after so long a Journey, to rest a while.

*Your, &c.*